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and thus relieve their families from added expense and trouble, it seems
that some modification of this statute is to be desired. Such a modifi-
cation should probably be in the nature of a prohibition against paying
such disputed claims before the legal representative can qualify and
claim the funds, particularly when the Government has notice of the
dispute.
BERNARD CR0WELL.
FELA Suits in Inconvenient State Courts-the Mayfield Case
The venue section of the Federal Eployers' Liability Act' gives a
plaintiff a wide choice in the selection of a forum, 2 but this privilege has
been abused3 to the extent that a huge interstate commerce in actions
brought under the FELA has developed through the efforts of certain
law firms in several metropolitan centers. 4
Since 1910 5 the FELA has expressly provided that a suit may be
brought in a state court, or in a United States district court, (1) in the
district of the residence of the defendant, or (2) in the district where
the cause of action arose, or (3) in any district in which the defendant
shall be doing business at the time.0
Efforts by some railroads to avoid being sued in forums inconvenient
to them, by the use of injunctions, were unsuccessful. The United
States Supreme Court, in Baltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner,7 held
that a state court could not restrain a resident from continuing the
prosecution of a suit under the FELA in a distant federal district court,
or interfere with the privileges of federal venue.8 The following year,
'35 STAT. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §§51-59 (1946).
235 STAT. 66 (1908), as amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946).
" The open door may admit those who seek not simply justice but perhapsjustice blended with some harassment. A plaintiff sometimes is under temptation
to resort to a strategy of forcing the trial at a most inconvenient place for an ad-
versary, even at some inconvenience to himself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U. S. 501, 507 (1947).
'Winters, Interstate Commerce in. Damage Suits, 29 JouR. Am. JUD. Soc. 135(1946). The chief centers are New York, Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis, Min-
neapolis and Los Angeles. Many of these cases are brought from great distances,
some froni California to Chicago. See Winters supra at 137, and Note, 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
The original FELA, adopted in 1908, made no provision for venue. Follow-
ing Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 82 Conn. 373, 73 Atl. 762 (1909),
holding that courts of Connecticut did not have jurisdiction to entertain an action
based on the FELA, Congress amended the Act in 1910 to provide that "thejurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be con-
current with that of the courts of the several states. . . ." 36 STAT. 291, as
amended, 45 U. S. C. §56 (1946). The United States Supreme Court later com-
mented that "the amendment, as appears by its language, instead of granting juris-
diction to the state courts, presupposes that they already possessed it." Mondou
v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 56 (1912).
' See note 2 mpra.7314 U. S. 44 (1941).
8 The injunction could not be used "for the benefit of the carrier or the national
transportation system, on the ground of cost, inconvenience or harassment." Balti-
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the same court, in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R.,9 held that a state court
could not restrain the prosecution of an action under the FELA in an-
other state court on account of inconvenience or harassment to the
defendant. 10
In 1948, Congress, with knowledge of the Kepner and Miles deci-
sions, enacted section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code." This section
provides that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any
other district or division where it might have been brought," which in
effect gives the federal courts the power to use the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.'2 In 1949, the United States Supreme Court held that
section 1404(a) not only applied to the general venue provisions ap-
plicable to the federal courts, but also the special venue provisions of
the FELA.' a
This development in the federal courts caused plaintiffs to resort to
the state courts-inasmuch as these courts were not subject to the pro-
visions of section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code. Attempts made by
railroads to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens to these suits
in state courts have had some interesting consequences.
The case of Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield14 was an
original proceeding in mandamus to compel a trial judge in Missouri to
use his discretion in passing on a motion, grounded solely on forum non
more & Ohio R. R. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 54 (1941). Inequity based on cost,
inconvenience or harassment is the argument most often presented in favor of
granting dismissal under the doctrine of forum non coveniens.0315 U. S. 698 (1942).
10 However, it had been held in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107 (1890),
that the right of a state court to prevent unjust resort to the courts of another
state was well established. The decision in the Miles case seems to be limited
to the situation where a federal right is sought to be litigated in the other state
court, insasmuch as ". . . the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United
States the supreme law of the land, binding on every citizen and every court and
enforceable wherever jurisdiction is adequate for the purpose . . .We are con-
sidering another state's power to so control its own citizens that they cannot exer-
cise the federal privilege of litigating a federal right in the court of another state."
Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 315 U. S. 698, 703, 704 (1942).
1162 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. §1404(a) (1950). Note, 29 N. C. L.
REv. 61 (1950) (concerned chiefly with the interpretation to be given section
1404 (a)).
" The doctrine of forum non conveniens "deals with the discretionary power of
a court to decline to exercise a possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the
cause before it may be more appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctrine
of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1929).
See Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Convenieis, 35 CALIF. L. Rav. 380
(1947).
"
3Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55 (1949). Section 1404(a) was also held to
apply to the special venue provisions in the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 26 STAT.
209 (1890), as amended, 15 U. S. C. §§4, 5 (1946). United States v. National
City Lines, 337 U. S. 78 (1949). Justices Black and Douglas dissented in this
case and in Ex parte Collett, mupra, on the ground that Congress has not made it
sufficiently clear that "any civil action" as used in section 1404(a) extended to
special venue statutes not found in the Judicial Code, Title 28, U. S. C.
" 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. 2d 105 (1949).
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conveniens, to dismiss an action brought by a non-resident under the
FELA.15 The Missouri Supreme Court held that the judge could not
in the exercise of 'discretion grant a dismissal. The case involved one
accident which occurred in Tennessee, 700 miles distant from the forum,
and another which occurred in Oklahoma, 647 miles distant.1 6 This
decision seems to be grounded on two principles: (1) That "under the
Kepner and Miles cases, a state court cannot dismiss a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability case solely under the forum non conveniens doc-
trine,"17 and (2) that a dismissal would violate the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution.' 8 Upon cer-
tiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed this decision,' 0 say-
ing that "if the Supreme Court of Missouri held as it did because it
felt under compulsion of federal law as enunciated by this Court2 o so to
hold, it should be relieved of that compulsion. It should be freed to
dlecide the availability of the principle of forum non conveniens in these
suits according to its own local law."2' 1 [Italics added.]
The United States Supreme Court further stated in the Mayfield
case22 that a state court decision to the effect that the doctrine of foruom
non conveniens cannot bar an action brought under the FELA, might be
based on one of three possible theories: (1) That according to its own
notions of procedural policy, the doctrine is not part of its law (where
no federal issue is involved), or (2) that by reason of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, a state may not discriminate against citizens of sister
states, or (3) that previously announced federal law compelled such a
decision (which compulsion the court held not to exist).
In relation to theory (2), the Court stated:
"Therefore Missouri cannot allow suits by non-resident Mis-
sourians for liability under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
arising out of conduct outside that state and discriminatorily deny
access to its courts to a non-resident who is a citizen of another
state."'28  [Italics added.]
" Undoubtedly, the only thing the railroad had to gain in compelling the use of
discretion in passing on the motion to dismiss on the theory of forum non con-
veniens was the bare chance that the court would have decided that the motion
should have been granted due to the hardship on the defendant in defending in
that forum.
1" State ex rel. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Murphy, 359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W.
2d 105 (1949), was a case on precisely the same question and was consolidated
with the Mayfield case.
117 Id. at 837, 224 S. W. 2d at 107.
18 "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states." U. S. CONST. ART. IV, §2.
19 Missouri ex tel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1 (1950).
90 The Court here was referring to the Kepner and Miles decisions. Justice
Jackson in a concurring opinion, Id. at 5, stated: "The Missouri Court appears to
have acted under the supposed compulsion of Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 315
U. S. 698...."
-"Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5 (1950).See note 20 supra.
23 Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5 (1950). There is
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This raises an important constitutional question. The Court has held
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secures to citizens of one
state the right to resort to the courts of another state.24 Although this
guarantee has certain qualifications, the Clause does not require a
state to supply its courts with such jurisdiction that citizens of other
states may litigate certain classes of cases, unless it affords juris-
diction to the same classes of cases brought by its own citizens, 25
even when rights under the Constitution are sought to be adjudged.
The Clause only "requires a state to accord to citizens of other states
substantially the same right of access to its courts as it accords to its
own citizens."20  The right to resort to the courts of another state is
conditioned upon that court's jurisdiction as determined by local law2 7
and its own notions of procedural rules.28 One of these rules is the doc-
trine of forum iwit conveniens,2 9 but like other procedural rules, it must
apply alike to citizens of the state as well as to citizens of sister states.30
some feeling that Justice Frankfurter here might have been thinking of the avail-
ability of the courts rather than the availability of forumn nor conveniens, since the
Privileges and Immunities Clause could not prevent the use of forum non con-
veniens except in a situation where the state had a policy of applying the doctrine
to one class of citizens and not to another.
2' Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Clarendon Boat Oar Co., 257 U. S. 533 (1922). "The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
the purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim
the benefit of habeas corpus; to institute actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; ...may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities
of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges
deemed to be fundamental. . . ." Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552, No. 3,
230 (E. D. Pa. 1823). Under a state statute which provided that a foreign cor-
poration could be sued by a non-resident in the state courts only when the foreign
corporation was doing business in that state, no violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause occurred since the discrimination was made on the basis of
residence and not citizenship. Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S.
377 (1929). A statute which prohibited the bringing of an action for wrongful
death in the state unless the deceased was a citizen of that state was held valid,
because the discrimination was not based on the citizenship of the person bringing
the suit. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207 U. S. 142 (1907).
" Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373 (1903).
-
0McKnett v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 292 U. S. 230, 233 (1934).
27 "But, subject to the restrictions of the Federal Constitution, the state may
determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the con-
troversies which shall be heard in them. The State policy decides whether and to
what extent the state will entertain in its courts transitory actions, where the
causes of action have arisen in other jurisdictions." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R., 207 U. S. 142, 148 (1907).
2. "It [venue section of the FELA] does not preclude any procedural require-
ment of the forum which plaintiff selects for the trial of the case. Plaintiff's
attempt to stretch the decisions to preclude the power to enforce local rules, or
local methods of procedure, or any of the usual practice regulations, other than
those relating to venue, seems contrary to the very terms of the section itself...
Grant v. Pennsylvania R. R., 8 F. R. D. 40, 41 (1948).
2" Koster v. (American) Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U. S. 518 (1947);
Williams v. Green Bay & W. R. R., 326 U. S. 549 (1946).
"0 "But any policy the state may choose to adopt must operate in the same way
on its own citizens and those of other states. The privileges which it affords to
one class it must afford to the other." Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 207
U. S. 142, 148 (1907).
19521
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Since the decisions in the Kepner and Miles cases have been clarified by
the Mayfield decision,31 there seems to be nothing in the FELA to com-
pel state courts to entertain cases brought under it, and this has been
frequently stated. 2 It follows that an action brought in a state court
under the FELA would be subject to the doctrine of forum non con-
vetiens, if the state court permitted the doctrine to be used when an
action under the FELA is brought by a citizen of the forum. Conversely,
if the forum did not allow the doctrine in FELA suits by its own citizens,
a policy allowing it when the action is by a non-resident citizen 83 of a
sister state would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.3 4 Thus,
if state A does not allow the doctrine to be used by defendant X, citizen
of state Y, when X is sued by citizens of state A, then to allow the doc-
trine to be used by X when sued by citizens of state B would result in
unconstitutional discrimination against citizens of state B.
Faced with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court, the
Missouri Supreme Court, dealing with the case for the second time,85
merely reiterated that since it was the policy of that state to allow citi-
zens of Missouri (resident and non-resident) to bring and maintain suits
under the FELA in Missouri courts, that to bar citizens of other states
from doing likewise would violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
This leaves something to be desired, in that it seems to contemplate
mere jurisdiction, for the court nowhere said that it had a policy re-
jecting forum non conveniens in FELA suits brought by its own citi-
zens. Before a motion to 'dismiss based on the doctrine can be enter-
1 "But neither of these cases limited the power of a State to deny access to its
courts to persons seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act if
in similar cases the State for reasons of local policy denies resort to its courts and
enforces its policy impartially . . . so as not to involve a discrimination against
Employers' Liability Act suits and not to offend against the Privileges-and-Immuni-
ties Clause of the Constitution. No such restriction is imposed upon the States
merely because the Employers' Liability Act empowers their courts to entertain
suits arising under it." 340 U. S. 1, 4 (1950).2 Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 223 U. S. 1, 56 (1912). "As to
the grant of jurisdiction in the Employers' Liability Act, that statute does not
purport to require State courts to entertain suits arising under it but only to em-
power them to do so, so far as the authority of the United States is concerned
... but there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty upon
such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse." Douglas v. New York, N. H.
& H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 387 (1929). See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 120(1945).( It seems that few, if any, situations would arise where a court would dismiss
an action brought by a resident citizen of a sister state, since in that situation, it
would be imposing an obvious hardship on the plaintiff to force him to bring his
action in a court outside the state of his residence.
" If the discrimination is based on the residence of the litigant rather than on
his citizenship, the discrimination is valid under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. "But if a state chooses to (prefer) residents in access to often over-
crowded courts and to deny such access to all non-residents, whether its own
citizens or those of other States, it is a choice within its own control." Missouri
ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 4 (1950).
" State ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 240 S. W. 2d 106 (Mo. 1951), cer-
tiorari denied, 72 S. Ct. 107 (U. S. 1951).
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tained, the court must have jurisdiction,3 6 and then consideration of
the motion is in the discretion of the court. Since Missouri accepts
jurisdiction, in order to discriminatorily deny access to its courts to
citizens of sister states, it would have to formulate a policy whereby
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was available to defendants
sued by citizens of sister states, but not to defendants sued by citi-
zens of Missouri. The only Missouri case cited by the Missouri court8 7
in the last decision to substantiate its position was a case dealing with
the jurisdiction of the court and not the availability of forum non con-
veniens. However, there is some indication that this doctrine is not
part of the law of Missouri, for in at least one previous case38 involving
a motion to dismiss an FELA suit, on the ground that the cause of action
arose in the state of Illinois, that all parties were residents and citizens
of Illinois, and that the plaintiff could have brought his suit in Illinois,
the court held that the interpretation given its statutes 'did not give it
discretion to decline jurisdiction.
New York and Utah have held that an action brought under the
FELA may be dismissed without the benefit of a controlling statute.3 9
Illinois and Ohio have held that because of certain venue statutes, an
FELA suit may not be maintained there as a matter of right ;40 while
Missouri and California have held that their courts are not invested with
the discretion to deny jurisdiction when the action is brought in the
inconvenient forum.4 1  Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire and New Jersey have indicated that their courts have the discre-
tion to deny jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action between two
non-residents.42 Other jurisdictions have either failed to decide the
"o "Indeed, the doctrine of forum non conveniens can never apply if there is an
absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 504 (1947).
' State ex rel Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Grimm, 239 Mo. 135, 143 S. W.
483 (1911).
.8 Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 20 S. W. 2d 684 (1929).
"
0 New, York. Murnan v. Wabash Ry., 246 N. Y. 244, 158 N. E. 508 (1927);
Utah. Mooney v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R-, 221 P. 2d 628 (Utah 1950) (motion
for dismissal denied on other grounds).
" Illinois. Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2 (1917) (wrongful death
action under FELA, statute prohibited wrongful death action for death occurring
in another state). Ohio. Loftus v. Pennsylvania R. R., 107 Ohio St. 352, 140
N. E. 94 (1923) (state statute excluded from jurisdiction of state courts all actions
for wrongful death occurring without the state unless the claimant is a resident of
the state).
" Missouri. See note 34 supra. California. Leet v. Union Pac. R. R., 25 Cal.
2d 605, 155 P. 2d 42 (1944). In this case, the Kepuer and Miles decisions were
cited as controlling authority that California had to grant jurisdiction. Query:
Would California so hold after the Mayfield decision?
"
2 Florida. Hagen v. Viney, 124 Fla. 247, 169 So. 391 (1936) (suit for specific
performance of separation agreement where both parties were non-residents of the
forum). Louisiana. Union City Transfer v. Fields, 199 So. 206 (La. App. 1940)
(action on a promissory note made and payable in Texas, both parties being resi-
dents of Texas). Massachusetts. Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank,
281 Mass. 303, 184 N. E. 152 (1933) (action by domestic corporation, as assignee
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
question or have indicated that their courts do not have the liscretion
to decline jurisdiction.43
Looking at the effect of the Mayfield decision upon the overall prob-
lem faced by the railroads in coping with the inconvenient FELA suit,
little if anything has been achieved. The most that can be said is that
the compulsion previously thought to exist under the Kepner and Miles
decisions is now removed, as well as any compulsion thought to exist in
the Act itself. Only the litigant's rights under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause remain mandatory upon the state court. Accordingly,
some additional remedy is necessary to eliminate the unethical practices
of "ambulance chasing" firms, and the consequent inequitable burden
placed upon the railroads in defending the inconvenient suit.
In 1947, the House of Representatives passed the Jennings Bill,4 4
which would have amended Section 6 of the FELA to authorize the
bringing of an action under the Act only in the district or state where
the accident occurred or where the injured party resided, and only when
the railroad could not be served in either place could an action be brought
wherever the railroad was doing business. 45 It seems clear that by so
of bank deposit by Russian bank, brought against English bank of deposit not
doing business in United States; refusal to retain jurisdiction under rules of
comity and under doctrine of forum non conveniens). New Hampshire. Jackson
& Sons v. Lumbermens' Mut. Cas. Co., 86 N. H. 341, 168 Atl. 895 (1933) (action
by insured against its liability insurer for negligently conducting the defense of a
suit against thie insured where both parties were residents of other states). New
Jersey. Anderson v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 18 N. J. Misc. 153, 11 A. 2d 607
(1940) (action by residents of Pennsylvania against a Pennsylvania corporation
for wrongful death occurring in Pennsylvania).
"3 North Carolina is typical of these states. See McDonald v. MacArthur Bros.
Co., 154 N. C. 122, 69 S. E. 832 (1910). The majority of the states which have
denied their courts this discretion have so held because they have felt that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution prohibited it.
""A civil suit for damages for wrongful death or personal injuries against any
interstate common carrier by railroad may be brought only in a district court of
the United States or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, in the district or
county (parish), respectively, in which the cause of action arose, or where the
person suffering death or injury resided at the time it arose: Provided; That if
the defendant cannot be served with process issuing out of any of the courts afore-
mentioned, then and only then, the action may be brought in a district court of the
United States, or in a State court of competent jurisdiction, at any place where the
defendant shall be doing business at the time of the institution of said action."
H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
" The opponents of the Bill argued that the solution to the problem was in the
prevention of solicitation rather than in curbing the wide venue privileges. Pas-
carella v. New York Cent. R. R., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y. 1948). Labor argues
that these FELA suits should be brought in industrial centers where juries are
more capable of assessing damages, due to their own peculiar knowledge of the
needs of the working class. But this seems to amount to little more than an argu-
ment that plaintiffs under the FELA should be allowed to go "shopping" for a
favorable court and jury. On the other side the argument exists that something
must be done to curb the unethical practices of the handful of "ambulance chasing"
lawyers. It is apparent that state laws and local bar associations are not effectively
controlling this matter. A balancing of these arguments seems to weigh in favor
of curbing the venue privileges.
[Vol. 30
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narrowing the venue, the solicitation of suits40 would be greatly reduced.
The Bill died in a Senate committee.
Another possible solution would be the creation of a workmen's com-
pensation act applicable to employees of interstate railroads.4 7 A rea-
sonable compensation for all injuries sustained, regardless of negligence,
might prove to be more desirable than a few cases of very large recov-
eries where the injury is a major one and where the railroad is clearly
negligent. However, the adoption of a federal act in this field seems
unlikely.4 8
The evils surrounding the misuse of the venue privileges given by
the Act could be greatly diminished by each state adopting the doctrine
of forum non conveniens as part of its law, but at best this result would.
be slow and decidedly uncertain. Due to the inability of Congress or the
federal courts, as 'displayed by the Mayfield case, to make the doctrine
of forum von conveniens available as a procedural rule in the state
courts, 40 serious reconsideration should be given to the Jennings Bill
as offering the better solution to a proper administration of the federal
act. Certainly, such flaunting of legal ethics and principles of justice5°
demands immediate and well considered attention.
WILLIAM C. MORIMS, JR.
Life Insurance-Killing of Insured by Primary Beneficiary-
Recovery by Contingent Beneficiary
It has been almost universally held, based on broad grounds of pub-
lic policy, that the beneficiary of a life insurance contract who intention-
ally and wrongfully kills the insured cannot recover the policy proceeds.
This does not absolve the insurer from liability under the usual insurance
contract, but only denies the beneficiary's right to recover. Under such
circumstances the benefits may be recovered by the estate of the deceased
insured on a constructive trust theory. However, the insurer has been
held absolutely relieved of all liability under the policy where the bene-
ficiary at the time of obtaining the policy of insurance intended to mur-
"' An example of a state statute authorizing injunction against solicitation in
this field is N. C. GEN. STAT. §84-38 (1950). This statute is discussed in 25 N. C.
L. REv. 379 (1947).
'" Winters, Interstate Commerce in Damage Suits, 29 Joun. Am. JUD. Soc. 135,
144 (1946).
8 Ibid. Labor generally regards the maximum benefits obtainable under existing
state acts as far too small.
'' Due to the fact that Congress cannot make procedural rules for the courts
which it does not create, it is generally conceded that Congress may not make theforum non conveniens doctrine available as a procedural rule in state courts. This
seems to be borne out by the fact that Congress, in enacting section 1404(a) of the
Judicial Code (28 U. S. C.), made no attempt to apply that section to state courts
in which actions under the FELA might be brought.
" For an example, see Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. R. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278,
226 N. W. 297 (1929).
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